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Being in centro
The Anthropology of Schelling’s
Human Freedom
Michael Vater
Articolo sottoposto a doppia blind review. Inviato il 09/09/2020. Accettato il 28/09/2020.

Schelling presents the 1809 freedom essay as the idealistic flowering of a vision of system he
always held. He is not disingenuous but somewhat perplexing in claiming that the system
always was complete in nuce, even though not expounded completely. Tilliette captured the
ambiguity nicely in designating Schelling’s oeuvre «une philosophie en devenir»1. This midcareer essay must be read backwards to the earliest essays republished with it – especially to their
views of willing, freedom, and moral responsibility – and simultaneously forward to the late
philosophy’s analysis of God’s freedom as freedom from being, even necessary being. I locate
Freedom’s fulcrum in the novel anthropology or affective psychology that Schelling brings
to the philosophy of will. Material freedom, capacity for good or evil, is assessed by norms
of psychological maturation, whether conscious or unconscious forces determine behavior.
If ‘moral necessity’ or normativity is the lens for assessing agency, formal self-determination
moves from the domain of deliberation to a pre- or unconscious option for good or evil, and
one’s character unfolds necessarily.

***

Introduction
The 1809 Investigations appeared in a collection of Schelling’s earlier

essays meant to announce his turn from a transcendental idealism aligned with
realism or Naturphilosophie to an explicit idealism2. Schelling remarks that
this essay and its sole precursor, Philosophy and Religion, are conversational in
tone although much of their contents might be rigorously argued, and that they
Tillette writes: «Le développment demeure la grande énigme, et la principal intérêt de la
philosophie schellingienne…À condition que l’on enlève à l’image sa resonance pejorative,
nous n’aurons pas de repugnance à récupérer l’enseigne de Protée» (X. Tilliette, Schelling, une
philosphie en devenir. I: le Systéme vivant 1794-1821, Paris 1969, pp. 14-15).
2
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling Historisch-kritische Ausgabe I, 17, eds. C. Binkelmanm, T.
Buchheim, T. Frisch, V. Müller-Lüneschloss, Stuttgart 2018, pp. 25-26/Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters, tr. P. Hayden-Roy, in Philosophy of
German Idealism, ed. Ernst Behler, New York 1987, pp. 217-18. The earlier essays had argued
that transcendental idealism is oriented toward action and presupposes freedom, that freedom
is absolute necessitation or self-determination, and that the absolute identity is best viewed as
the end of action, not a state of consciousness abolished in a singular intuition.
1
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merely signal the turn to idealism that subsequent studies will develop3. The
essay’s title, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and
Related Matters, invites reflection on what Schelling’s previous versions of system
offered as the basis of philosophy and how the turn to the problem of freedom
alters the program of objective idealism. The new direction replaces previous
static accounts that made absolute identity or subject-objectivity their principle
with an emergent ontology of willing [Wollen] modeled on the psychodynamics
of human reality. Systematic philosophy now takes psychological development,
not mathematics, as its paradigm; moral, not logical necessity governs the journey
from nature to humanity to personality – or from yearning to willing and love.
The shift alters Schelling’s previous conversations with Spinoza and Kant that
were focused on physics and epistemic questions but underplayed the thinkers’
concerns with life-guiding activity or liberation from negative emotions.
The freedom essay undertakes new conversations with old friends. Two
exchanges with Spinoza, one on freedom and necessity4, the other on identity
and system5, bookend an extended dialogue with Kant on the nature of willing
or reason guided activity. Schelling ignores the logical apparatus of Kant’s
formal theories – prescriptivism, universality and uniformity – but embraces
his candidate for material freedom, a timeless (hence unconditioned) option
for good or evil that manifests as altruistic or egoistic character. He follows
Kant’s view that egoism is radical evil by making a self-enclosing tendency the
antecedent condition for developing what in humankind become consciousness
and conscientiousness [Bewußtseyn, Gewissenhaftigheit]6 and in God becomes love
or personality. This same self-will or claustrophobic self-reversion that presents
as madness or evil in the psychic domain occurs in nature as the first dimension
of matter, the expansive but other-repelling component of gravity. In dynamic
language, this is the will of the ground; viewed statically, it is bare being , the
necessary condition for the unfolding of the existent or subject of being (das
Seyende) in all areas that matter to idealism or philosophy of spirit--physiology,
psychology, morality, God and religion. In Schelling’s view, it is the same (not
just analogical) self-will that manifests in nature as darkness or materiality – from
matter’s impenetrability to the limited cycle of life, reproduction and death in
organisms – that in agents or self-determining subjects presents as extreme states
or symptoms, clinical and moral: health or contagion, sanity or derangement,
good or evil. As an emergent (evolutionary) process, humanity makes itself
into an ontological wager, a precarious spirit whose mastery of both elemental
energies and conscious processes is logically open and without guarantee, a
matter for fundamental or ontological choice. In God’s timeless self-separation
from the natural ground and journey into personality – a necessary identity of
natural and spiritual powers – God leaves open a middle ground of contingency
Ibid., p. 174 n./p. 279 n. 36.
Ibid., pp. 111-123/pp. 219-231.
5
Ibid., pp. 170-179/pp. 276-284.
6
Ibid., pp. 158-159/pp. 264-265. Subsequently cited as HKA I, 17, __/HF, __.
3
4
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between natural necessity and the moral necessity of love that voluntarily binds
autonomous beings into an intentional unity7. Humankind is that open space,
the center – the personality it may or may not become.
This paper explores some of the freedom essay’s views on metaphysical
monism, willing and human freedom by looking to Schelling’s earlier theories,
but its central concern is the novel psychology he places at the core of the system
of spirit that makes affect and impulse the core of the human psyche, something
akin to kinetic energy and resistance in mechanistic physics, or to Spinoza’s conatus
essendi. Although earlier attempts to turn transcendental idealism into a system
preserved the outline of Kant’s critiques of cognitive, practical, and reflective
judgment--while excising items like the thing-in-itself and the categorical
imperative as speculative excess – the freedom essay recovers the pragmatic focus
of Kant’s late essays on morality, politics, religion and anthropology. Just as
Schelling adapted the dynamical sections of Kant’s metaphysical groundwork
of nature – the view of planetary motions as a dynamic equilibrium of opposed
forces, or Newtonian gravity – as the template for his Naturphilosophie 17971806, he now adapts the psychodynamics of Religion within the Limits of Reason
– with egoism or universalism marking as the polar directions of the agent’s
moral compass, as the framework for his philosophy of freedom. If in 1800 he
could epitomize the transcendental account of human capacities as «the Odyssey
of spirit»8, he might well now describe the path from nature to freedom as an
‘Odyssey of conscience’. Schelling’s claim is that a theory of freedom which merely
describes willing as choice or self-determination is empty («formal») if one looks
away from humankind’s individual and collective vocation, the decision between
good and evil. Decision between good and evil is the measure of psychodynamic
maturity (or response to «moral necessity») for the agent poised on the knife
edge between instinctive self-concern and awareness of others. Choice between
them sets one’s moral character – a choice hidden from the ebb and flow of
events in a dimension Schelling calls «eternity», but we might call the repressed
or the irrecoverable. In relocating moral psychology to a hidden, preconscious
domain, much the way Plato relocates it to the mythical domain9, Schelling
restlessly breaches the Enlightenment wall between philosophy and religion,
enlarges the repertory of human deeds to powers both demonic and divine, and
That Schelling also paints this journey of onto-psychological maturation as a version of Christianity’s core narrative of creation, fall, and redemption in the Word/world of God’s making
might seem to us a distraction. In the Eurocentric historicism of his time, to search for a
concordance of all narratives and all sciences seemed a ‘scientific’, not a culinary, pursuit. But
Christian doctrine is subjugated to the philosophical question of theodicy in 1809. Later, positive philosophy takes the theology of revelation as the quod est demonstrandum of philosophical
inquiry. See Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation (1841/2), On the Distinction between Revelation and Mythology and the Comprehensibility of Revelation, trs. J. Carew and M. Vater, in The
Schelling Reader, eds. D. Whistler and B. Berger, London 2020, pp. 386-392.
8
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling Historisch-kritische Ausgabe I, 9.1, eds. H. Korten and P.
Ziche, Stuttgart 2005, p. 328/System of Transcendental Idealism, tr. P. Heath, Charlottesville
1978, p. 232. Hereafter cited as HKA I, 9, 1, __ /STI__.
9
Plato, Republic, 588b-598a, 617d-620c.
7
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reasserts for his not-quite-postmodern time the ‘divine comedy’ of Christian
revelation – or for us perhaps the tragicomedy proffered by psychoanalysis or
Deleuze’s deconstructions of difference, desire, and virtuality.
I will first consider the freedom essay’s defense of Spinoza’s monism, its
revision of the logic of identity, and proposal for a philosophy of will (grounding).
Then I turn to Schelling’s investigation of human freedom, contrasting theories
of its emergence from the strife of naturalistic self-absorption to the equilibrium
of consciousness and conscientiousness to the impersonal phenomenology
of willing offered in the System of Transcendental Idealism. I then explore
Schelling’s vision of material freedom, the human power to retain or restrain
the evolutionary order of being, both natural and psychic, to harness disordered
basic energies into purpose. The basic pattern is Platonic in inspiration, the
social-moral transformation of desire into social order and to love – or to interfere
with orderly evolution (being-in-the-center) and instead move to the periphery
of individualism. While it is certainly difficult to be a card-carrying Platonist
after Darwin, Schelling’s construction is still of interest because it maps a
scheme of affective disorder-or-development onto the moral domain and adopts
something of the grim tooth that today’s religious thinkers, psychoanalysts, and
anti-theorists exhibit for the grittier things of life. A look to the unpublished
Stuttgart Seminars of 1810 which offer a finer array of affects than the longingwilling-love triad of the freedom essay leads me to reflect on the plausibility and
value of this sort of story. Things imaged in the mirror of language might yet be
useful, if not empirically true. To put norm and fact in the same bed is difficult.

1. First Conversation with Spinoza: Identity, Ground, and Willing
Schelling always looked to Spinoza and Kant as the two points that
determined the orbit of his thought, though at difference times one or the other
functioned as the solar peg or gravitational center, while its counterpart defined
the imaginary point that made its course elliptical. The identity that was always
Schelling’s concern was not a static hybrid of realism and idealism, or some
reflective compromise between theory and practice, but a dynamic identity of
opposites whose dynamism connoted real opposition and a processive resolution
of those oppositions. The Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism defend the
theoretical reach of Spinoza’s monism, but offer a critique that will become as
perennial as it is programmatic: the unity of the system is not the problem, but
its lifelessness, or needless sacrifice of agency and freedom to an argument that
erringly equated logical necessity and determinism10. Schelling’s initial discussion
Schelling extensively quotes Jacobi’s conversation with Lessing, where the former gives a
highly interpretive formulation of Spinoza’s monism as a theory «permitting no egress from the
infinite to the finite», a theory superior to prior «Kabbalistic» constructs linking creator and
creation. See Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, I, 3, eds. H. Buchner, W. G. Jacobs, A. Pieper, Stuttgart 1982, pp. 83-84, 95-96/F. W. J. Schelling, The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794-1796), tr. F. Marti, Lewisburg 1980,
10
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in the freedom essay defends Spinoza’s metaphysical monism, his equation
of causality and necessity, but attempts to surpass his earlier arguments that
mere construction from dynamic elements supplied life to a unitary system,
and offers a reinterpretation of the principle of identity that captures procession
or emergence rather than static unity. Schelling’s overall view in 1809 is that
a living system incorporating both a divine evolution towards personality and
a contingent spiritualization of humankind will reconcile claims to freedom,
necessity as self-determination, and «moral necessity» or normativity. The task
requires one remake the philosophical lexicon in three respects: a) redefining
identity from static identity to sufficient reason: the emergence of consequence
from conditions or consequent from antecedent, b) changing the summum
genus from being to willing: metaphysical voluntarism, and c) positing an
ontological difference that distinguishes being (ontic reality) from existence as
subject (ontology).
Schelling articulates this logic of emergence in what he bills as his «final
verdict» on Spinoza’s pantheism: his monism may be necessitarian or fatalistic, but
it is predicated on a model of mechanistic physics, not on ontological grounds.
Metaphysical monism leaves formal freedom at least possible; dependence does
not eliminate freedom. Spinoza’s mistake is not that things are in God, but
that besides God, there are things in the abstract sense of sensible appearances.
Neither God nor modes are conceived as the living realities that speculative
physics discovers in nature – «ideas» or organic unities of ideal and real powers11.
The immanence of things in God does not define pantheism, nor even the
insistence that there are no beings praeter deum. Schelling recalls a distinction he
made in passing in 1801 between being or ground of being (Seyn) and existence
or being a subject (das Seyende) to argue that spirit or self-responsible being must
have captured that position (personhood) by an ascent from the former to the
latter, an emergence from a passive state of being into subjecthood or agency.
This spiritual definition of being as free agency applies equally to God and to
the dependent beings of creation: becoming, not being, is the sole concept apt for
a self-defining being, and this requires an original nature or ground in the agent
from which she emerges. The creature must be rooted in a ground different from
God, viz. nature, or «that which is in God, but is not God himself, i.e., in that
which is the ground of his existence»12.
pp. 177-178, 185-186. Schelling wrestles with Spinoza’s refusal to justify his disjunction of the
two attributes knowable to us or to explain the difference of matter and mind in the Presentation of My System of Philosophy and subsequent works, arguing that «in and of itself, nothing is
finite». See M. Vater, «In and of itself, nothing is finite»: Schelling’s Nature (or So-called Identity)
Philosophy, in Kant, Fichte, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism, eds. H. Kim and S. Hoeltzel, Lanham, MD 2015, pp. 191-210. In Human Freedom, Schelling reverts to the Kabbalistic
alternative, portraying the emergence of human reality from nature and God’s evolution as
personal as part of a cosmic history. See P. Franks, From World-Soul to Universal Organism:
Maimon’s Hypothesis and Schelling’s Physicalisation of a Platonic-Kabbalistic Concept, in Schelling:
Freedom, Nature, and Systematicity, ed. G. A. Bruno, Oxford 2020, pp. 71-92.
11
HKA I, 17, p. 122/HF, p. 230.
12
Ibid., pp. 129-130/pp. 236-238.
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Schelling closes the first conversation with Spinoza by suggesting a
reorientation of metaphysics to a volitional terrain, focused upon a preconscious
energy seemingly akin to the blind, purposeless force that Schopenhauer will
posit as the irrational counterpart of reason. But the «will» Schelling has in
mind is not a titanic bundle of tormented energies but the quiescent facies totius
universi on view in the refined Spinozism of the 1804 Würzburg lectures13. «Will
is original being and to it alone all predicates of being apply: groundlessness,
eternity, independence of time, self-affirmation»14. The key concept here is selfaffirmation; the being that births itself by stepping up from being to subjecthood
is expressive. Spinoza, and in his footstep Fichte, both advanced the axiomatic
claim that being is powerful, expansive, or expressive--an intrinsically unlimited
energy in need of the determination (negation) that limitation supplies.

2. Kantian Theories of Freedom, Formal and Material
The central argument of the Philosophical Investigations of Human Freedom
elaborates a richer concept of freedom than the «formal freedom» that Kant
and post-Kantian discussions of moral theory offered. If one eliminates the
undetermined choice implicit in ‘arbitrary choice’ and the under-determined
choice of teleological theories that look to results or conformity to ‘natural law’,
only self-determination accounts for the unforced yet specific nature of an agent’s
choices. But apart from some vision of what one decides to be, self-determination
is an empty formula. The power to make oneself something involves alterity: to
determine oneself to be this as opposed to that, or in this way as opposed to that.
Both states or modalities must be genuine possibilities within the reach of my
bodily and psychological functions. And the choice involves a decision, a fork in
lifepaths joined at one sole point; option for one puts the other beyond reach.
Schelling calls such fundamental decision material freedom.
One can imagine that a person makes several materially important
decisions in her life – choice of beliefs and vocation, or of partnered, solitary or
communal lifestyle; these are ontic choices. Schelling follows Kant in thinking
there is one and only one ontological exercise of material freedom, the choice
between whether one is for-oneself (egoism) or for-others (universalism) – the
will’s decision between good and evil as a timeless choice of character or ‘essence’.
Late in his life, Kant had put forth his ideas on rational (or moral) religion in a
pragmatic or unsystematic manner in Religion within the Limits of Reason; using
a thin version of his classic theory of morality that contrasted self-concerned
behavior (following private maxims) and moral conduct (obeying universal
laws), he posited a core of «radical evil» in humankind to explain the persistent
tendency to self-interest. The evil lies not in sensibility nor in a corruption of
Letter 54: Spinoza to Schuller, in Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics and Selected Letters, tr. S. Shirley,
Indianapolis 1982, pp. 253-254.
14
HKA I, 17, p. 1232/HF, p. 231.
13
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reason, but in a tendency to adopt self-interest rather than the general will as
the spring of one’s conduct15. More precisely, evil is the disordered choice of
maxim over law, and evil’s root is the capacity to order (rightly or wrongly) these
conflicting springs of action. Schelling quietly adopts Kant’s analysis, calling the
bent toward egoism the «will of the ground» and law’s countervailing insistence
on universality «understanding», whose cognizant yet volitional quality he
underscores by calling it consciousness and conscientiousness. He is wholly in
accord with Kant in maintaining that what is at issue in material freedom is
ordering (or failure to order) private and universal springs of conduct, or natural
and intellectual powers (the will of the ground and understanding). For Kant,
the disposition of these powers is the agent’s moral capacity; for Schelling, it is
the defining quality of spirit (Geist).
Schelling parses his exposition methodically, inquiring about the possibility
of evil, then its actuality, its appearance in humankind, then in individual
humans. Our specific interest centers on the last two, the anthropological
dimension, and on the subjective or psychological cast he gives it, moving moral
psychology closer to personal narrative or ‘confession’ than the spiritual director’s
handbook or clinician’s diagnostic manual. Like contemporary theorists who
move from conceptual discussions to pieces of cinema that concretely locate
human possibilities (Cavell, Žižek, Deleuze), Schelling’s early nineteenth century
writings, many unpublished sketches, move toward concrete, even novelistic,
representations of affects, attributing a power or motive force to them that is
overlooked by objectifying concepts such as Spinoza’s conatus or Kant’s maxim.
What is interesting in Schelling’s treatment of affects here, the Stuttgart Seminars,
Clara and drafts for Ages of the World, is the precognitive teleology with which he
imbues affects, an ontological but noncognitive direction that locates the subject,
or the subject-in-diaspora, as a search for inclusion, incorporation, or relative
identity in interdependence. Schelling refocuses the romantic problematic
of fragment or system as the subject’s (whether human or divine) life-defining
question in a play of affects that move from inchoate to explicit scenarios of
personal (or interpersonal) integration. Schelling relocates the typical speciesdefining mark of reliance on rational process to an intermediate role on the path
from the inchoate dreaming of self-absorption to love or other-identification.
This is a distinctly modern psychology, marked by contingency, singularity, and
a horizon of failure – for norms presume both adherence and failure as live
possibilities.

3. Willing Objectified – the Transcendental Viewpoint
Schelling previously conducted a survey of the whole phenomenology of
willing in the practical section of the 1800 System of transcendental Idealism;
Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloβen Vernunft, AA I, 6, A28-30/
B35-37, A38-44/B41-47.
15
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the picture he produced there is comprehensive, but impersonal, a product of
observation, analysis and theory, not introspection. We must examine this text
if we are to appreciate the radical novelty of the 1809 Investigations which place
desire in the center of being, or, as in the 1810 Stuttgart Seminars, describe
the core human function as «self-existing spirit [sua natura Seyende], a selfigniting flame, but since as existing it is distinguished from being [Seyn], really
nothing other than addiction [Sucht] to being»16. The unflattering picture of
spirit as for-itself deflated to in-itself is a First-Step admission of failed agency,
the anxiety-ridden confession of one for whom freedom is agonizing choice,
not purposiveness. The descriptive, almost sociological objectivity of the earlier
System is, by contrast, God’s-eye or transcendental.
In the public’s eye at least, Schelling was still allied with Fichte in 1800.
From the standpoint of Wissenschaftslehre, the finitude of empirical perception
allows intuition only of objective states, never of the infinite activity that
produces them. Original activity and limitation are transcendental suppositions
introduced on a theoretical level, in order to unpack the accomplished synthesis
that experience delivers. Therefore, the philosopher who surveys the System of
Transcendental Idealism lacks a direct intuition of reason’s agency and can only
undertake its imaginative reconstruction in a reflected or «intellectual» intuition.
Schelling’s narrative portrays infinite activity as a ‘technical’ or self-concretizing
endeavor, a production, whose product is partially captured in a finite state
or intuition and partially retroflected back to itself. As reflected, productive
activity becomes a second intuition, a cognition or intuitant of the preceding
intuition. Production ceaselessly concretizes activity, but always partially and
within a limit that is merely ideal, hence surpassable and repeatable17. If we can
imagine a transcendental 3-D printer that would materialize intangible energies,
its program would dictate an accumulation of successive of layers of product,
each ontologically ‘thin’ but resulting in ‘thicker’ items like states, functions,
and entities. Were the device self-designed, self-programed, and materially selfsupplied, this digital demiurge would approximate Schelling’s Absolute. What
we take as higher-order intuitions, sensation, perceptions, and propositions
access only produced, concretized acts of self-determination. Arranged as a series
of episodes of production-intuition, the system displays freedom in its body
(nature) and soul (spirit as second nature), but never in its pure energic form of
activity or self-determination.
In such a context – which is as objectivistic as our technical analogy suggests
– willing cannot appear as the self-constitution of the subject, but only an
environment of objective and intersubjective conditions for self-determination.
The activity is hidden; the philosopher’s sole access to it is through an act of
«absolute abstraction» wherein intelligence turns away from objectivity and

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling Historisch-kritische Ausgabe II, 8, ed. V. Müller-Lüneschloss,
Stuttgart 2017, p. 156 (translation mine).
17
HKA I, 9, 1, pp. 88, 90-91/STI, pp. 48, 50.
16
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acts upon itself18. Schelling can map each condition in its connection to its
neighbors and argue that what other accounts of will and morality propose
as sufficient conditions for right action are one-sided or incomplete, but the
system’s motor forever hides ‘self-enacting freedom’ in an array of physical,
mental and interpersonal qualities, forces, and constraints which are but its
products. The philosopher-archaeologist can reconstruct the ground-plan of the
refractory of spirit from its geological traces but cannot conjure Hephaestus’ fire.
No metaphysics of will is possible, for activity is evanescent. Willing shows up
only in traces as individual states of mind and social interaction, ossified into
habits, folkways, commands, law, the drift of history and spectral remainders
like institutions, technologies, sciences, and art. Schelling’s «Odyssey of spirit»
presents an itinerary, but its hero is missing.
Nonetheless, the System’s phenomenology of willing is comprehensive.
Before it becomes active in a practical sense, the I is already autonomous or
self-constructing. In willing, it first becomes objective to itself; it locates the
sum-total of its activities in an already determined objective environment, its
situation, to which it makes further active contributions. Its active projection and
realization of goals are the counterpart of its hitherto unconscious production
and intuition, the foundation of the objective order19. Schelling here bridges
Kant’s abyss between theory and practice but relocates the tension to the I’s own
productive activity: self-determining yet situated, hidden from its constitutive
activity as intelligence. A pre-established harmony between my willing and
another will which is located in an external intelligence is needed to provide
a voluntarist account of objectivity, a summons or Aufforderung that signifies
the pressure of other wills upon mine. The limits that this other intelligence
places upon mine become a necessary condition of my agency20. Autonomy
or self-determination morphs into obligation, the objective or theoretical form
willing takes before it can engage. Obligation is objectified self-recognition, a
universal will seemingly opposed to the agent’s; it is the practical counterpart of
the objective world collectively projected by the interaction of intelligences21.
The objectivity of the common world and pressure of intelligences upon my
will lead to a third restriction of activity, concretion into individuality, and the
restriction of willing to the few remaining features of the world that remain
un- or under-determined in advance of my action. My overall passivity in the
face of nature and the social world is the condition of the limited agency I have,
and even then, I am not able to refrain from completing the world in some way.
Situated freedom means that freedom is limited before I can become conscious
that I can and should act22. Schelling here deconstructs Fichtean promethean
activism into the primal geometry of Leibniz’s monadic metaphysics where one
Ibid., pp. 230-231/p. 155.
Ibid., pp. 231-236/pp. 156-159.
20
Ibid., pp. 236-238/pp. 160-161.
21
Ibid., p. 242/p. 164.
22
Ibid., pp. 246-247/pp. 168 -169.
18
19
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acts only insofar as one reacts to a cloud external influences which are the work
of other agents.
Schelling extends the paradox of limited agency situated in an ‘open’ but
unconscious horizon of nonactivity that I have in fact authored to a second round
of limitations or compromises. The object of willing at this level is the work of
the imagination which interweaves ideal and real activities into a constellation
of functions that appears to be something objective, a drive, but which appears
internally as only as feeling, or awareness of limitation. Through its drive, the
I takes on the character of a substance over time, an orderly change of states
or accidents. But its sense of being a self is its perception of being-affected as
a self23. This concretion of the I’s activity into an objective world-order means
that agency is a disappearing item: «we act freely, and the world comes to exist
independently of us»24. Action has just as much reality as the world it acts upon;
each is illusory. Drive therefore becomes objectified in a somatic nexus, and
internal impulse and external demand compel willing merely as conditions for
the appearance of self-consciousness25. The psychic dimensions of self-interest,
desire for happiness, deliberation in the context of a hedonic calculus, and
arbitrary choice are added as further determinants of the appearance of will,
but Schelling is clear that individuality, choice, and subjectivity are disappearing
factors – or mere appearance – in the face of the unconscious or preconscious
self-determination that transcendental freedom requires. The subject disappears
into a single pixel on the screen backlit by the ontological self-determination the
System constructs.
The major difference between the 1800 System and Human Freedom is
the absence of the concrete subject in the former, and its vivid presence in the
later. The wider view of objective idealism espoused in the intervening years
convinced Schelling that the philosopher need not be restricted to the empiricism
which is the result of Kant’s theoretical philosophy nor to the abstract legalism
of his practical philosophy. It would take us far afield to find a methodological
rationalization for this wider view, but it certainly breaks free of the conceptual
timidity of a skeptical ‘modern’ philosophy anchored in doubt and attempts a
broad historical conversation with philosophies of nature and ethics, trading
in the ‘modern’ Plato of Theaetetus’ preoccupation with logic, belief, and
justification for the mythic Plato of Timaeus and Philebus, with their striking
mixture of metaphysics and mathematics. Schelling’s lifelong practice was to
alternate academic systematic construction with popular discussion. The former,
which often directly appealed to a form of intuition even when set out in a
quasi-deductive form, employed a form of Leibnizian explanation that Schelling
called Darstellung. It offered a situated conceptual analysis sufficiently intense
to produce insight, which carried a narrative rather than logical necessity. The
later might take the form of essays, polemics, critical reviews, or even dialogues
Ibid., pp. 259-260/pp. 178-179.
Ibid., p. 264/p. 182.
25
Ibid., pp. 271-272/pp. 187-188.
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and novellas, but they essentially involved testing the axioms and arguments of
philosophical alternatives against one another26.

4. The Subject Who Wills – the Platonic-Kantian Account
We return to the central sections of the 1809 Investigations where, Schelling
initiates his discussion of anthropology – and of the possibility of evil – by
defining the human’s mode of being as spirit: a willed union of her natural basis,
the ground of particularity or self-will, and light or universal will. The possibility
of evil lodges in the human’s ontological makeup. By being spirit – willing or
decisive being – humanity is free from both principles, able to choose whether
the contractive will of the ground remains subject to universal will, light, or
asserts itself against it as intentional self-will. The first is called being in centro,
the latter flight to the periphery – or quiescence in equilibrium as opposed to
anarchy27. It is difficult to decipher these initial statements; one must return
to the Platonized anthropology of Bruno where «ideas» were said to be the
union of finite and infinite elements, the real ‘things’ as opposed to the sensible
experience of «fallen» individuals, or to the Naturphilosophie of that era which
argued that transparent objects are the genuine natural things, as opposed to
opaque objects where light is retarded by gravity28. If being spirit – contingent
capacity to will or determine itself – means that humanity as the unity of matter
and light can either make itself into universal will or go opaque and obscure the
light it carries, then the capacity for good or evil or freedom of decision becomes
the fundamental human power or basic mode of being, not just a transient
ontic state. Humanity is essentially a question about what it is and what it
shall be. Raised to «supernaturalness» by the divine process of self-creation/
revelation, humanity can instead revert to nature; rather than be a single will
that commands or rules its psychic forces, it can become a torrent of desires,
longing, and craving. When the archaic life principle, irritability, steps out of
the depths where it was the bond of opposite forces, an imaginary life of falsity,
fantasy, and unrest ensues – comparable to body disease and mental disorder29.
Unlike the animal, where instinct provides an automatic union of powers that
See J. Schmid, Schelling’s Method of Darstellung, in «Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science», LXIX, 2018, pp. 12-22.
27
HKA I, 17, pp. 134-136/HF, pp. 242-243.
28
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling Historisch-kritische Ausgabe I, 11, eds. M. Dürner and I.
Radrizanni, Stuttgart 2017, pp. 365-366/F. W. J. Schelling, Bruno, or On the Natural and Divine Principle of Things, tr. M. Vater, Albany, 1984, p. 143 – Cited hereafter as HKA I, 11, __
/B, __. See also Presentation of My System, § 99, Cor. and Expl, and § 100. and Expl. in The
Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence (18001802), eds. and trs. M. Vater and D. W. Wood, Albany 2012, p. 181.
29
Schelling cites Franz Baader’s speculations on the relationship between wildfire and organic
heat, inflammation, and health – keeping fire and water energies in balance – and the possibility of transferring from being in centro ʘ and being at the periphery Oo. All these analogies
turn on concepts of balance or equilibrium, or their opposites. See HKA I, 17, p. 137 n./HF,
pp. 244-245 n.
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functions as desire or blind craving, human spirit can choose whether to affirm
or destroy the bond of forces that it is30. Schelling’s discussion of the actuality of
evil pictures a cosmo-theological process that posits an evolution of a ground of
selfhood in nature and its spiritual repetition in mythology and history, all as part
of the story of the divine self-articulation. The method of Darstellung requires
no new data to move from possibility to actuality, just intensified intuition, so
it is not surprising to see Schelling bracket this account with repeated references
to the human center-or-periphery choice. The divine drama is the backstory of
humanity’s existential situation.
Man is placed on the pinnacle where he has the source of self-movement toward
good and evil equally within him; the bond of principles within him is not a necessary
one but a free one. He stands at the junction; whatever he chooses, that will be his
deed. But he cannot remain in indecision, because God must necessarily reveal himself
and because in creation nothing whatsoever can remain ambiguous31.

In the cosmic perspective, the will of the ground is merely the foil for the
unfolding of the divine will of love; only in the divine history is the reign of love
secure. Our experience, however, is of the arousal of the ground, the dance of
the irrational and accidental, the night sweats of contingency. Schelling imbues
his story with the aura of tragedy, with its unrelenting contrast between the
equanimity of the gods and implacable human suffering. Not only is the will
of the ground a counterforce to the will of love, but it is force destructive of
intelligence and freedom, a rage against the «supernatural». For the individual
human, life in the center is both fiery and suffocating so that one flees from
center to the periphery where one’s life goes from idiosyncratic self-absorption
to self-enclosed life and thence to death. «The fear of life itself drives man out of
the center in which he was created, for this center is, as the purest essence of all
will, a consuming fire for every particular will; man must…attempt to step out
of it into the periphery in order to seek rest there for his selfhood»32.
A third segment of the discussion of the interrelation of freedom and
evil combines elements of formal freedom – perennially figured by Schelling
as self-determination – and choice of good or evil. The latter is a timeless
choice of character, unconscious or preconscious when viewed from empirical
consciousness, but made within the parameter of nature or «first creation». It is
a determination that is not a negation or qualification of a generality, but the
positing of a timeless essence. This essence will be realized progressively in time,
hence according to necessity, but it is nonetheless the individual’s free choice.
«[P]recisely this inner necessity is itself freedom; man’s essence is essentially his
own deed; freedom and necessity are one being which appears as the one or the
other only when viewed from different aspects; in itself it is freedom, formally

Ibid., p. 142/p. 249.
Ibid., p. 143/p. 250.
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Ibid., p. 149/p. 256.
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it is necessity»33. The comment is one of Schelling’s few commendations of a
Fichtean idea after 1806. Prior to knowing, neither knowing nor not-knowing,
it is basic positing or self-affirmation, willing that makes itself into the basis of
all essence. The human individual’s self-creation mirrors divine creation, but
the contingency of one’s choice reflects the ‘crisis’ quality of the move, the sharp
edges between living in nature, acting in spirit, or dwelling in love.
Closing the discussion of freedom with a coda on the appearance of evil in
humanity, Schelling moves to the territory of ‘religion’ or pneumatology where
his argument hews close to St. Paul’s that humans must choose what kind of spirit
to be. Humanity’s choice for good is the opening for divine love to be the bond
of forces – to become perfect understanding; the opposite choice is the attempt
to be that bond independently, to be ruled by «false imagination» and become
the «inverted god»34. True religiosity, claims Schelling, echoing comments
made in 1804, is conscientiousness [Gewissenhaftigheit], acting according to
one’s knowledge [Wissen] and not contradicting the light of knowledge in one’s
actions35. It can appear as heroism, courage, decisive trust in the divine, or simple
adherence to duty. In all cases, to do what is right is to do exactly what one must
do – and cannot omit doing36.
The decentered will of false imagination entails disorder; the inverted god
lives in rebellion or a false independence. Yet the centered human will that joins
itself to divine love seems to both be independent in some respects and in others
to live subjected to the rule of a superior. Schelling describes divine love in terms
he once used to define sexual union and biological dimorphism: «[T]here is
love neither in indifference nor where opposites are combined which require
combination in order to be, rather…this is the mystery of love, that it combines
what could be by itself and yet is not and cannot be without the other»37. Our bias
may lead us to see a coequal ‘romantic’ relationship in this «cannot exist without
the other», but it may be the codependence of a quite gendered relationship, as
Alison Stone has suggested38. As the centered human moves into personhood by
sublimating longing into luminous consciousness and unites both into spirit,
spirit itself looks to the initial unground raised above all, the same toward all but
Ibid., p. 152/p. 259.
Ibid., pp. 156-157/pp. 262-263.
35
System der gesamten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere (1804), § 310 (Expl.),
in Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke I, 6, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Stuttgart
1856-61, pp. 485-489. Hereafter cited as SW I, 6___.
36
HKA I, 17, pp. 158/HF, 265-266.
37
Ibid., p. 172/278. Cp. System der gesamten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere
(1804), §211. Schelling there explains biological dimorphism and sexual reproduction through
God’s connection of the real to the ideal: «True identity is seen only in exponential form, i.e.,
in such an unity that though each factor is for itself, yet it never is without the other. […] This
is the character of a divine identity, different from the finite where only such opposites can be
combined as require each other in order have substantiality, but of such opposite factors where
each is absolute, yet cannot exist without the other» (SW I, 6, p. 407).
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A. Stone, Nature, Freedom, and Gender in Schelling, in Schelling’s Philosophy: Nature, Freedom
and Systematicity, ed. G. A. Bruno, Oxford 2020, pp. 167-184.
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unaffected by all. «It is beneficence, free from all, yet pervading all – in a word, it
is love, which is all in all». Although Schelling uses masculine language to speak
of God as a martial spirit who subjugates both the dark ground of nature and
the will to clarity, he also speaks of human reason as the analogue of the divine
primum passivum, divine wisdom which is traditionally figured as feminine39.

5. «Moral Necessity» – Yearning, Willing, Loving
Before considering Schelling’s second conversation with Spinoza that
concludes Human Freedom, we should flesh out its new volitional psychology –
blind desire that is controlled by knowing (consciousness and conscientiousness)
which, in turn, becomes spirit under the control of divine love. The triadic
psychology of desire, habituated conscience, and eros in pursuit of wisdom
of course defines Platonic psychology, not the epistemically oriented triad of
sensation, perception, and judgment that dominates modern philosophy. The
1810 Stuttgart Seminars amplify the scheme with details that show not just
the influence of Fichte’s psychology of feeling (Gefühl, receptivity arising from
self-limitation) but the refined taxonomy of the emotions projected in both
classical and romantic German literature40. Schelling explains in more detailed
manner how being is evolution, both in God and humankind, a move from
unconscious nondifferentiation into conscious distinction and ordering of the
dark and light powers. «Life in its entirety is properly speaking always only
an intensified coming to consciousness […]. There always remains a residual
obscurity (nobody ever reaches both the highest good and most debased
evil)»41. Creation consists in God ejecting the dark element in order to educate,
transform, and transfigure it into something godlike. It is original matter or the
primal unconscious, bare being; God’s intent is to transform it into something
kindred, the existent subject42. God is neither the self-complete essence that
orthodox Christian doctrine presumes nor the colorless universal that pantheism
imagines; rather what is most individual in God serves as basis for universal will
in a developmental process that is morally necessitated. «If there is love in God,
there is also wrath, and it is the wrath of God’s own proper force that lends
support, ground and permanence to love»43.
Schelling’s explanation of evil in the Stuttgart Seminars again returns to the
theme of humankind lodging in the middle of things, poised between nature’s
nonbeing and God’s absolute being. The human is said to be both in the middle
HKA I, 17, pp. 172/HF, 278; cp. Ibid., p. 178/p. 283.
See D. Breazeale, Thinking Through the Wissenschaftslehre: Themes from Fichte’s Early Philosophy, Oxford 2013, p. 116 and n.
41
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling Historisch-kritische Ausgabe II, 8, ed. V. Müller-Lüneschloss,
Stuttgart 2017, p. 96/Stuttgart Seminars (1810), in Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three
Essays by F. W. J. Schelling, tr. T. Pfau, Albany 1994, p. 207.
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of and above nature, the point of transition from darkness to light; at once the
result of a long process of intensification or empowerment in nature, the human
is the place where nature adapts to the spiritual. Hence, as the central being, the
human is placed at the point of indifference44. But the ontotheological process
whereby God, in parting from nature, unites it with humanity is mirrored in
reverse by a dark stage in human development, a self-subjugation to nature
wherein species unity is sundered into a multiplicity of agents whose internal
life is dominated by externality45.
According to the Seminars, the internal life of the central being is a
structure of three capacities whose activity situate it either in nature, as selfposited spirit, or dwelling in the divine unity; each function is expressed on
three levels. The first capacity is Gemüth: habitual disposition or temperament,
an inarticulate outreach to absent objects. Its first expression is Sehnsucht, the
second Schwermuth, and the third Gefühl – yearning or nostalgia, melancholy,
and feeling or sensitivity. In both yearning and nostalgia, desire is haunted by
absence. Melancholy is the antithesis of spirit, a self-igniting fire whose ‘high’
involves literal substance-abuse: dependence on being. In feeling, the human
is closer to the threshold of imaging, expressing and communicating, but its
affection is primarily internal and so is mute46. Feeling is the foundation of
psychic life just as irritability is the foundations for the organisms more developed
functions of sensitivity and reproduction.
The universal dimension of spirit, therefore, is desire – addiction to being.
Its second capacity allows it to actualize desire as spirit in conscious desire or
willing, the correlate of Human Freedom’s «conscientiousness and consciousness».
At its primary level, willing is blind appetite, forceful and egoistical – unless
it is informed and mastered by the third or highest power, understanding, the
counterpart of Freedom’s ‘universal will’. Between the two is willing proper, an
underdetermined will with a deviant power to erect nonbeing in place of being or
create disordered situations like disease, error and evil47. Although we commonly
speak of spirit as the highest human capacity, it is portrayed here as middling
and malleable capacity haunted by dire possibilities – not the dignified central
being of the freedom essay.
The third and highest capacity of spirit makes it more of an entity than a
function, or a point rather than an algorithm: Seele. Soul is science itself rather
than knowing, and the good itself rather than right action. Yet it can be viewed
functionally since it anchors the continuum of psychic functions – all of which
can be figured as forms of desire. Soul is the principle of eros connected with its
ultimate object, the good. The capacity, its object, and its end all merit moral
esteem – the philosopher’s vision, according to Plato. But if soul does not rule and
its functions are discontinuous, there arise either affective disorders in the order
Ibid., p. 140/p. 225.
Ibid., p. 142/p. 226.
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of temperament, or cognitive disorders, nonsense, and miscommunication in the
intellectual order, or in soul itself the ultimate malady, madness – the realization
of the irrational48. With the delineation of its operations as temperament,
conscious willing, and soul, the Seminars’ construction of spirit is complete.
Schelling nonetheless extends the consideration of soul in an interrogative way,
briefly raising here as he does extensively in Clara, the question of whether soul’s
life might continue after its separation from natural and conscious life49. These
explorations are conversational or tentative in nature; Schelling was interested
in animal magnetism or hypnotic connection to departed souls as much as
in religious ideas of personal survival. For us, however, what is interesting in
Schelling’s new volitional psychology are the normative ideas of order and
disorder, connection and disconnection, health and pathology embedded in
the discussion. Although such norms can be applied diagnostically from the
outside by the scholar, clinician, or psychoanalyst, they essentially concern an
internal organization of functions that is the responsibility of free individuals
and/or supporting social environments. They are about dispositions or states
of freedom vis-à-vis unfreedom, ‘crisis’-management in the ontological sense of
the term. What is most striking about Schelling’s psychological scheme is its
ancient-and-modern character: if all is in order in the house of mind, Schelling’s
account reads like Plato’s three-part soul; if all is not in order and dynamic
equilibrium gives way to displays that are pre-personal, unconscious, repetitive
and non-purposive, the scheme points us toward psychoanalysis or forms of
medical and social intervention. The life of freedom is what most defines the
central being, or the fragility of that life.

6. Bringing Spinoza to Life: Ontology Subordinated to Axiology
Final sections of the Kantian discussion in the freedom essay make the
case that the normative (Schelling says «morally necessary») character of the
whole cosmic evolution – the taming of nature, the freeing of humankind, and
the personalization of divine forces that were initially impersonal – yields a
Ibid., pp. 160, 162/pp. 233-234.
Clara’s date of composition is disputed, though conventionally assigned to 1810. One feature
arguing for that date is the position it assigns to soul at the pinnacle of the psychic heap, as do
the Stuttgart Seminars. «Bliss is freedom and the rule of the soul» (SW I, 9, pp. 43-45, 177-78/
F. W. J. Schelling, Clara, or On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World, tr. F. Steinkamp, Albany
2002, pp. 33-34, 80). Yet the connection of the psychic powers presented in the dialogue is
not the center-periphery, or top-down hierarchy of Human Freedom and the Stuttgart Seminars,
but rotation or alternating patterns of connection between them, betokening something more
like interdependence than Platonic order. Ibid., pp. 46-48/pp. 35-36. Only when domestic altercations between the claims of body and those of spirit have been quieted can the Verklärung
of human capacities occur and the human become one thing – in God’s hands. But until then,
the rotation of powers here figured as the life of the psyche seems more like the rotation of
powers in the undecided imagination of the archaic deity featured in Ages of the World. See F.
W. J. Schelling, Die Weltalter, Fragmente, ed. M. Schröter, Munich 1966, pp. 36-38/Ages of the
World, Book I (1811), tr. J. Lawrence, Albany 2019, pp. 95-97.
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convincing theodicy. Evil is not due to an insoluble conflict of principles, nor to
some privation tainting intrinsic goodness. That nature is ejected from godhead
as the price of God’s becoming personal, and that humans are left free to flee
the center – the place of ontological connection – and degrade the environing
nature into a jumble of discordant forces is a satisfactory outcome if judged from
a cost-benefit or double-effect theoretical point of view50. I am not sure Leibniz
would find it optimal, but the metaphysical constraints on a theory of freedom
are heavy: a person has agency on the basis of forces impersonal and personal,
she is responsible for integrating those forces without an internal model, and
what model she has is constructed from various social voices, personal and
impersonal. Schelling’s theodicy is psychologically realistic, based on careful
anthropology – but provocative theology if divine and human personality are
analogically related in a symmetrical way51.
Schelling returns to Spinoza and the territory of metaphysics in the essay’s
final pages. That Spinoza’s metaphysics is pantheistic is not objectionable; its
theory of being is comprehensive and unitary. What can be said about being apart
from its manifestations in natural or mental phenomena is quite uncomplicated:
it is one, expressive or powerful, its manifestations causally successive, governed
by a necessity at once mechanistic and logical. All this Schelling accepts. His
perennial complaint against Spinozism, however, is that it is a lifeless construct,
a robotic march of inexplicable modes of attributes (material and mental)
that we do not really comprehend. On a grand-theoretical scale, Schelling
easily solves the problem. Personality, or the life of conscious agency involves
uniting and controlling impersonal forces, physical and mental, so that they
become powers of a living subject (das Seyende) instead of passive facts or found
episodes of motion (Seyn). Personalization is the emergence of subjecthood
from nature as the sum-total of bodily and mental events. Jacobi’s assertion that
God’s personality is incomprehensible was a refusal not only to Spinozism but
to philosophy as such – for there is nothing closer to us, or subject to so much
concern or anxiety on our part, than the normative weight of becoming and
remaining personal52. If our closest concern is to become personal, what better
candidate for the item of ultimate concern than the process of personalizing or
humanizing the upshot of impersonal, natural, unconscious forces. At the core
of any metaphysics that would explain humans’ conscious and conscientious
abiding in historical values and traditions is the image of humanity as a fragile
convergence of natural, psychological, and moral capacities – the suffering hero.
Paraphrasing a passage from Bruno, Schelling claims, «Being becomes sensitive
to itself only in becoming […]. [I]n actualization through opposition there is
HKA I, 17, pp. 164-167/HF, pp. 270-273.
Orthodox theology argues that natural reason can know God analogically, but the likeness is
intelligible only on the human side. Only apophantic theology can be precise in its denial of
the accuracy of the likeness. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 1, 12, Q. 9, Resp., ed.
A. Pegis, New York 1945, pp. 109-110.
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necessarily a becoming. Without the concept of a humanly suffering God […]
all of history remains incomprehensible»53.
Schelling calls this second discussion with Spinoza «dialectical». It opens
on a logical note and clarifies the asymmetric logic of emergence – result from
ground, das Seyende from Seyn, living unity from discord – that justifies using
concepts seemingly so anthropocentric as personality and personalization in
basic ontology. The emergent personalization that Schelling sees at the core of
the cosmic process is the end phase of logically larger process that begins in
undifferentiated identity or indifference, blossoms into conflicting tendencies
of will (the will of the ground versus the will of love) that are brought to
perfect personal identity in God. These conflicting wills are only contingently
reconciled in humanity’s fragile freedom which is the as yet undecided but always
to-be-decided contest between the blind force of impulse and the merely ideal
limitation imposed by human consciousness and conscientiousness, haunted by
enduring ambiguity54. Of course the divine will provides a paradigm for the
evolution of freedom/ambiguity into the settled states of love, science, and the
good, but the existential odyssey humankind must undergo as cosmic evolution
pushes from bare unity into loving community is a journey of suffering, fear
and discontent – for failing to discover the central position of humankind and
abide there entails sickness, psychopathology, depression and madness for the
individual agent.
Schelling’s evolutionary ontology sweeps aside the static questions and
answers of an old rationalism, and instead presents an axiological pattern to be
enacted, an anthropogenesis in seed. One no longer asks whether God exists
but whether a divinized humanity shall exist. Humankind assumes the work of
co-creation in Schelling’s epic prophecy, and the position of redeemer of nature:
[A]ll natural beings have mere being in the ground, or in the initial longing that
has not yet achieved unity with the understanding, so that they are mere peripheral
beings in relation to God. Only man is in God, and through this very being-in-God, he
is capable of freedom. He alone is a central essence, and therefore should also remain in
the center. In him all things are created, just as it only through man that God assumes
nature and combines it with himself55.
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